

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 144199

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CG, SHUM

SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS: DRAFT COUNTRY ACTION PLAN

REF: STATE 139160

1. THE FOLLOWING DRAFT COUNTRY ACTION PLAN ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ZAIRE WAS PREPARED IN AF/C AND IS FORWARDED FOR EMBASSY COMMENT. AS PRESENT REQUIREMENTS CALL FOR THE SUBMISSION OF THE FINAL ACTION PLAN ON JULY 1, EMBASSY KINSHASA IS REQUESTED TO SUBMIT ITS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY COB JUNE 29.

2. QUOTE:

--- HUMAN RIGHTS COUNTRY ACTION PLAN

----- ZAIRE

A. CONDITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ZAIRE

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1. RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON.

THIS PRINCIPLE IS EMBODIED IN THE ZAIRIAN CONSTITUTION. HOWEVER, THE PRINCIPLE IS VIOLATED IN PRACTICE, NOT SO MUCH AS A MATTER OF GOVERNMENT POLICY BUT BECAUSE ZAIRE IS A VERY LARGE COUNTRY WITH AN UNDEVELOPED CIVIL SERVICE, INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND MEANS FOR CONTROLLING WHAT HAPPENS OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL. ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT ACTION AGAINST INDIVIDUALS DOES OCCUR, BUT A MORE SERIOUS AND PERVASIVE THREAT TO THE

INDIVIDUAL ARE THE ARBITRARY ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS, POLICEMEN, OFFICIALS, AND OTHER ZAIRIANS (E.G., BANDITS). SPECIFICALLY,

A. THERE IS LITTLE IF ANY EVIDENCE OF TORTURE OR CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING PUNISHMENT BEING ADMINISTERED TO PRISONERS AS A MATTER OF GOVERNMENT POLICY. PHYSICAL ABUSE CERTAINLY DOES OCCUR, BUT THIS APPEARS TO BE LARGELY THE ACTION OF BADLY PAID, TRAINED, AND DISCIPLINED POLICE. EVEN IN THE TENSION-FILLED ATMOSPHERE OF THE RECENT INVASION OF THE SHABA REGION, ZAIRIANS ARRESTED HAVE REPORTED TO OUR EMBASSY THAT THEY SUFFERED NO TORTURE OR PHYSICAL ABUSE. HOWEVER, PHYSICAL HARDSHIP IN PRISON IS THE NORM (POOR OR NO FOOD, FILTHY AND CROWDED CELLS).

B. ARBITRARY ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT DOES OCCUR IN ZAIRE. SEVERAL HUNDRED PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED DURING THE RECENT INVASION OF THE COUNTRY (ALTHOUGH MANY WERE RELATIVELY QUICKLY RELEASED). IN MORE NORMAL TIMES THE NUMBER OF ARBITRARILY ARRESTED INDIVIDUALS IS RELATIVELY SMALL (PERHAPS SEVERAL DOZEN A YEAR) AND THEY ARE USUALLY HELD ONLY FOR VERY SHORT PERIODS OF SEVERAL DAYS OR SO. CONFIDENTIAL

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IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THESE ARRESTS ARE PART OF A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICY OR NOT, BUT MANY OF THESE ARRESTS DO APPEAR TO BE UNCOORDINATED ACTIONS BY OVER-ZEALOUS LOCAL OFFICIALS. IN THE RUMOR-PRONE ATMOSPHERE OF ZAIRE, REPORTS OF ARRESTS TEND TO SPREAD RAPIDLY AND BECOME EXAGGERATED. ONE PERSON RECENTLY EMERGED FROM JAIL UNHARMED AFTER HE WAS REPORTED EXECUTED.

C. INVASION OF THE HOME DOES OCCUR WITH ABOUT THE SAME FREQUENCY AS ARBITRARY ARRESTS AND WITH THE SAME APPARENT LACK OF CENTRAL COORDINATION AND PURPOSE.

2. RESPECT FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL LIBERTIES

THIS PRINCIPLE IS ALSO MORE HONORED IN THE BREECH THAN IN THE OBSERVANCE, ALTHOUGH THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT IS GENERALLY FAIRLY RELAXED AS LONG AS POLITICAL COMMENT AND ACTIVITY IS NOT OVERTLY ANTI-GOVERNMENT. THE EXTENT TO WHICH ZAIRIANS WILL CRITICIZE MOBUTU TO FOREIGNERS CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH THE ATMOSPHERE IN TRULY REPRESSIVE REGIMES.

A. THERE ARE NO PARTICULAR RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF THOUGHT ALTHOUGH THERE IS A GOVERNMENT EFFORT TO INCULCATE A NATIONAL PHILOSOPHY "AUTHENTICITY" WHICH DOES INHIBIT THE EXPRESSION OF ALTERNATIVE INTELLECTUAL OUTLOOKS. THE GOVERNMENT DID IMPLEMENT MEASURES TO RESTRICT

THE INDEPENDENCE AND PRACTICE OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN 1974 AND 1975 BUT HAS SINCE RETRACTED THEM. EARLIER THIS YEAR THE GOVERNMENT SIGNED AN AGREEMENT WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH WHICH RESTORED FULL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF PRACTICE. THERE ARE NO RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY EXCEPT THOSE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES WHICH ARE BY DEFINITION PROHIBITED UNLESS THEY ARE HELD BY THE SINGLE POLITICAL PARTY.

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B. FREEDOM OF TRAVEL IS UNRESTRICTED WITHIN THE COUNTRY. FOREIGN TRAVEL AND EMIGRATION IS GENERALLY UNRESTRICTED, BUT THE GOVERNMENT WILL OCCASIONALLY PLACE EFFECTIVE IF UNOFFICIAL OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS IT DOES NOT WISH TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY.

C. ZAIRE IS A ONE PARTY STATE, WITH ALL CITIZENS BY LAW BELONGING TO THE SINGLE POLITICAL PARTY. THERE IS NO DEMOCRATIC PROCESS ASSURING PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. TO PARTICIPATE POLITICALLY, A ZAIRIAN CITIZEN MUST JOIN THE NATIONAL PARTY AND ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN POSITIONS IN THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT.

3. TRENDS IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY

BEGINNING IN 1972-1973 THE GOZ LAUNCHED AN AMBITIOUS PROGRAM OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT CONCENTRATED ON LARGE CAPITAL PROJECTS AND BASED ON AN EXTREMELY HIGH LEVEL OF COPPER EXPORT RECEIPTS. THE PROGRAM TURNED OUT TO HAVE BEEN A SERIOUS MISTAKE, BOTH IN RESPECT TO THE

WORTH OF THE PROJECTS INITIATED AND THE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE COUNTRY'S ABILITY TO FINANCE THEM. IN ADDITION THE GOVERNMENT LAUNCHED A PROGRAM OF RADICAL ECONOMIC REFORM INTENDED TO PROVIDE FOR GREATER NATIONAL CONTROL OVER THE ECONOMY. THIS PROGRAM TOO WAS BADLY PLANNED AND IMPLEMENTED AND THE NATIONALIZATION MEASURES DID HARM THE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GENERALLY USEFUL ROLE OF NON-ZAIRIAN RESIDENTS OF ZAIRE. THESE ILL-TIMED EFFORTS COMBINED WITH ADVERSE WORLD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND THE CLOSURE OF THE BENGUELA RAILROAD IN ANGOLA, DAMAGED THE ZAIRIAN ECONOMY AND THE WELL BEING OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION. THE CONCENTRATION OF INDUSTRY

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HAS LED TO A SERIOUS NEGLECT OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR WHERE OVER 70 OF THE POPULATION LIVE AND DERIVE THEIR SUSTENANCE.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE GOVERNMENT INITIATED A PROGRAM OF SCHOOL REFORM, REQUIRING A COMPLETE GOVERNMENT TAKE-OVER OF ALL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE COUNTRY (HITHERTO LARGELY CHURCH AND MISSIONARY RUN). THIS PROGRAM TOO HAS RUN INTO SERIOUS PROBLEMS AND RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANTLY LESS ACCESS TO EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR MANY.

IN ADDITION TO THESE FORMAL PROGRAMS, THE EVIDENCE OF HIGH-LEVEL PROFITEERING AND CORRUPTION HAS INCREASED NOTICEABLY OVER THE PAST FOUR OR FIVE YEARS. THE CORRUPTION INVOLVES THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND HAS RESULTED IN THE DIVERSION OF SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES TOWARDS THE NATION'S ELITE AND AWAY FROM THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION. THE RURAL POPULATION HAS SUFFERED THE MOST FROM THIS ABUSE.

PRESIDENT MOBUTU IS A PRAGMATIC POLITICIAN WHO IS ABLE TO LEARN FROM HIS MISTAKES. BEGINNING IN 1976, HE SET ABOUT UNDOING SOME OF THE DAMAGE: RETURNING PROPERTIES AS AN INDUCEMENT TO EXPATRIATES TO RETURN TO ZAIRE; MAKING HIS PEACE WITH THE CHURCH; RETURNING CONTROL OF BASIC EDUCATION TO THE MISSIONARIES; AND BEGINNING A PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC REFORM WITH FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS FOR REDUCING PERSONALISM AND CORRUPTION IN MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY. IN EARLY 1976 THE GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED AN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND STABILIZATION PROGRAM WHICH, HOWEVER, WAS ONLY PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL. IN EARLY 1977 THE GOZ COMMITTED ITSELF TO A MORE SEVERE IMF STABILIZATION PROGRAM AND ACCEPTED A NEW SET OF DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT PRIORITIES INTENDED TO DIVERT GOVERNMENT EFFORT AND NATIONAL RESOURCES TOWARDS THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AND RURAL POOR.

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4. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT

THE EXISTING VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ZAIRE ARE TO A LARGE EXTENT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT, BUT PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S OWN INHERENT WEAKNESSES. THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT IS CENTRALIZED AND PERSONAL; IT DOES NOT REALLY PRESENT ITSELF AS DEMOCRATIC IN A WESTERN SENSE. IT CLAIMS LEGITIMACY ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT FULFILLS A HISTORIC ROLE AS THE CREATOR OF THE ZAIRIAN NATION AND THE SINGLE-PARTY REPRESENTATIVE OF A ZAIRIAN PEOPLE IN THE PROCESS OF FORMATION. IT DOES NOT, THEREFORE, RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMACY OF OPPOSING POLITICAL VIEWS AND WILL USE THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE TO CONTROL DIVERGENT POLITICAL OPINIONS WHEN IT FEELS ITSELF THREATENED.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT A MALEVOLENT GOVERNMENT; IT DOES NOT PURSUE AN ACTIVE,

COORDINATED POLICY OF OPPRESSION OF ITS CITIZENS. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS IS SMALL (PROBABLY IN THE LOW HUNDREDS OUT OF A NATION OF APPROXIMATELY 25 MILLION) AND THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE OF DELIBERATE TORTURE OR EXECUTIONS. NONE OF THE MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS SENTENCED TO DEATH FOR PLOTTING A COUP-D'ETAT IN 1975, FOR INSTANCE, (ABOUT TEN OUT OF THE TOTAL FORTY CONVICTED OF PLOTTING) HAVE BEEN KILLED. THE RECENT AND ALMOST SUCCESSFUL INVASION OF ZAIRE RESULTED IN THE ARREST OF SEVERAL HUNDREDS OF ZAIRIANS, MOST OF WHOM HAVE ALREADY BEEN RELEASED. NONE APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN TORTURED OR OTHERWISE ABUSED.

ALTHOUGH CENTRALIZED, THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT IS ALSO WEAK AND INEFFICIENT. THE GREATEST AND MOST OBVIOUS SHORTAGE
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IN ZAIRE IS THAT OF QUALIFIED PERSONNEL AND THE GOVERNMENT IS NO EXCEPTION. THE CIVIL INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING THE ARMY AND THE POLICE, ARE BADLY TRAINED, MOTIVATED, DISCIPLINED AND PAID. THEY ARE UNRELIABLE INSTRUMENTS OF THE LEADERSHIP AND CONSISTENTLY INDULGE IN THE ABUSE OF POWER WHICH IS THE HALLMARK OF UNDEVELOPED POLITICAL SOCIETIES.

THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR ECONOMIC AND SIMILAR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS MORE MIXED. MUCH OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC HARDSHIP AFFLICTING THE MAJORITY OF ZAIRIANS IS THE RESULT OF GOVERNMENT POLICY. THE RURAL SECTORS HAVE SUFFERED UNDER A SET OF GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES WHICH DISCRIMINATED AGAINST THEM. THE INFLUENCE OF HIGH LEVEL CORRUPTION, OF COURSE, IS

NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY BUT DOES STEM FROM THE ATTITUDES OF THE GOVERNING ELITE. (IT IS DEBATABLE, HOWEVER, WHETHER CORRUPTION IS ANY WORSE THAN IN E.G., NIGERIA).

THERE ARE HISTORICAL AS WELL AS INSTITUTIONAL REASONS WHICH SHAPE THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE TOWARD ITS PEOPLE. SINCE INDEPENDENCE IN 1960, ZAIRE EXPERIENCED ALMOST SEVEN YEARS OF CIVIL WAR OR SEMI-ANARCHY. PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S MAIN TASK, AND HIS CONTRIBUTION TO ZAIRE, WAS TO ESTABLISH THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OVER A VAST COUNTRY WITH OVER 200 SEPARATE TRIBES. THERE ARE DIFFERING OPINIONS ON THE VIABILITY OF A MORE DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM, WHICH WOULD BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO REGIONAL ASPIRATIONS. IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE REGIONS FEEL THEY SACRIFICE FOR THE SAKE OF KINSHASA. AS IN MOST LDCS, THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT PLACES INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL RIGHTS SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER ON THE SCALE OF VALUES BELOW ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT FOR THE COLLECTIVE

"GOOD OF THE NATION." THE RECENT ATTACK ON THE SHABA
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CAN ONLY HAVE STRENGTHENED THE SENSE OF INSECURITY ON THE PART OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IMPROVES AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS GET BETTER, THE REGIME WILL TEND TO BE MORE RELAXED IN ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE POPULATION, AND THERE WILL BE LESS OCCASION FOR INCIDENTS OR ARBITRARY BEHAVIOR. THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE INCIDENTS, HOWEVER, SO LONG AS THE GOVERNMENT MUST DEPEND TO CARRY OUT ITS WILL ON RELATIVELY UNEDUCATED, UNSOPHISTICATED AND UNDERPAID OFFICIALS WITH ONLY TENUOUS LINES OF CONTROL TO THEIR MINISTRIES IN KINSHASA.

5. COOPERATION WITH INVESTIGATION

THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE HAS AN AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS OUTSIDE INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. IT PERMITS FOREIGN JOURNALISTS AND NUMEROUS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, MISSIONARY GROUPS, ETC. TO OPERATE RELATIVELY FREELY. IT IS, HOWEVER, SENSITIVE TO CRITICISM AND WILL EXPELL OR OTHERWISE MOVE TO CUT OFF ACCESS TO OUTSIDE CRITICS WHO BECOME TOO VOCAL AND PUBLIC. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GOVERNMENT IS SENSITIVE TO CRITICISM THAT IT RESTRICTS OUTSIDE ACCESS. THIS WILLINGNESS TO PERMIT OUTSIDE INVESTIGATION COMBINED WITH A TENDENCY TO CUT IT OFF WHEN IT THREATENS TO BECOME TOO EMBARRASSING HAVE ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO ZAIRE'S POOR REPUTATION.

B. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

-- THREE-SIX MONTH TIME FRAME

-- MOST HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES DO NOT LEND THEMSELVES
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TO THIS SHORT TARGET TIME FRAME. DESPITE SOME INCREASED ARRESTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE SHABA INVASION, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF TORTURE OR MASSIVE REPRESSION TO WHICH WE SHOULD NOW REACT. HOWEVER, THE CONDITION OF REFUGEES ALONG PARTICULARLY THE CABINDAN-ZAIRE BORDER REMAINS A HIGH PRIORITY HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. WE SHOULD KEEP UP THE PRESSURE TO SEE THAT THEIR CONDITIONS ARE IMPROVED OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS BY EITHER THE UN HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES AND/OR VOLUNTARY AGENCIES.

2. TWELVE MONTH TIME FRAME

THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE IN THIS PERIOD ARE:

-- INFLUENCING THE GOZ'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM AND POLICIES TOWARDS GREATER CONCERN FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION AND PARTICULARLY THE RURAL POOR. THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE AS IT CAN AFFECT THE LARGEST NUMBER OF ZAIRIANS AND IS THE MOST FEASIBLE. THE PROCESS HAS ALREADY BEGUN. THE USG, IN COORDINATION WITH OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, AND THE WORLD BANK, HAS OUTLINED FOR THE GOZ A PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC REFORM WHICH DEALS WITH THE NEEDS OF THE RURAL POPULATION AND THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR. THE GOZ HAS FORMALLY AGREED TO THE IMF STABILIZATION PROGRAM AND IN PARIS ON JUNE 8-10, REITERATED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES RECOMMENDED BY THE IBRD AWAY FROM INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND TOWARDS HUMAN NEEDS. SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROGRAMS WILL REQUIRE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE BASIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRY, THEREBY HELPING TO CORRECT THE VERY WEAKNESSES WHICH ARE AT THE ROOT OF MANY HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

USG LEVERAGE IS RELATIVELY HIGH, GIVEN OUR LONG-STANDING CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOZ AND OUR MAJOR CONFIDENTIAL

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ROLE AS AN AID DONOR. (OUR LEVERAGE HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT DILUTED, HOWEVER, BY PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S FEELING THAT WE DID NOT FULLY SUPPORT HIM IN THE RECENT INVASION CRISIS). OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ESSENTIALLY AGREE WITH OUR VIEW OF THE NEED FOR THESE ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT REFORMS AND ARE COOPERATING CLOSELY WITH US.

TO BE SUCCESSFUL, WE NEED TO COMBINE EVIDENCE OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOZ WITH CONTINUING PRESSURE IN FAVOR OF THE NEW PROGRAMS. ZAIRIAN PERFORMANCE IN IMPLEMENTING THE IMF AND IBRD PROGRAMS WILL AFFECT OUR DECISIONS ABOUT FUTURE AID TO ZAIRE. WE ARE ESSENTIALLY FOLLOWING THIS POLICY TODAY THROUGH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL CONSULTATION IN THE IBRD CONSULTATIVE GROUP, PARIS CLUB OF CREDITOR COUNTRIES, AND WITH OTHER WESTERN DONORS.

-- REORGANIZATION OF THE ZAIRIAN ARMY AND NATIONAL POLICE (GENDARMERIE). THE RECENT INVASION OF ZAIRE AND POOR PERFORMANCE OF THE ZAIRIAN ARMED FORCES HAVE CONVINCED PRESIDENT MOBUTU OF THE NEED FOR REORGANIZATION AND REFORM OF HIS SECURITY SERVICES. THE SECURITY FORCES OF AN AUTHORITY GOVERNMENT WILL, OF COURSE, BE USED TO SUPPRESS POLITICAL OPPOSITION WHEN THIS APPEARS NECESSARY TO THE LEADERSHIP. IN MOST CASES, HOWEVER, WHERE THERE HAVE BEEN VIOLATIONS OF

HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE SECURITY FORCES, IT WAS THE RESULT NOT OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICY, BUT OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS BY AN ILL-DISCIPLINED AND LARGELY UNMANAGEABLE ARMY AND POLICE FORCE. INsofar AS REORGANIZATION AND REFORM OF THE ARMED FORCES CAN PRODUCE GREATER DISCIPLINE, THIS CATEGORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS SHOULD DECREASE.

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AT THIS MOMENT, FRENCH AND BELGIAN MILITARY ADVISORS ARE WORKING WITH THE GOZ TO DRAW UP A REORGANIZATION PLAN FOR THE ARMY AND NATIONAL POLICE, TO INCLUDE A SIZEABLE REDUCTION IN SIZE. THE USG HAS BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE GOZ IN THIS AREA. WE HAVE SIGNIFICANT LEVERAGE, WHICH WE INTEND TO USE TO SUPPORT THIS REORGANIZATION AND MODERNIZATION EFFORT.

-- -- BRINGING INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON GOZ HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES. THE U.S. STRATEGY OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS SHOULD BE TO BRING COORDINATED PRESSURE TO BEAR FROM A WIDE SPECTRUM OF SOURCES ON THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT TO MOVE IT TO IMPLEMENT NEEDED REFORMS. PRESIDENT MOBUTU AND THE ZAIRIAN ELITE ARE SENSITIVE TO THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTABILITY TO EFFACE THE DEEP-SEATED ASSOCIATION WITH THE BLOODY POST-INDEPENDENCE CONGO. THEY HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES VERY OPEN TO OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE IN CONNECTION WITH THE SHABA INVASION. THE MERE INVOLVEMENT OF LARGE NUMBERS OF OUTSIDE DONOR GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN A MULTILATERAL EFFORT TO GET ZAIRE BACK ON ITS FEET TENDS TO MAKE THE ZAIRIAN AUTHORITIES MORE CONCERNED FOR THEIR INTERNATIONAL IMAGE.

THERE ARE OBVIOUS LIMITS, HOWEVER, TO THE AMOUNT OF PRESSURE WHICH IS EFFECTIVE, AND WAYS IN WHICH IT CAN BE USEFULLY BROUGHT TO BEAR ON A LEADER WHO IS PROUD AND SENSITIVE AS WELL AS BEING VERY SKILLFULL AT PLAYING ONE DONOR NATION OFF AGAINST ANOTHER. IT WAS WITH CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY THAT MOBUTU WAS FINALLY PERSUADED IN 1976 TO IGNORE THE ADVICE OF THOSE ZAIRIANS WHO HAD RESISTED "MULTILATERAL TUTELAGE" ON MATTERS OF INTERNAL ECONOMIC POLICY. AS A RESULT, HE HAS ACCEPTED UNUSUALLY STRINGENT REQUIREMENTS FOR ECONOMIC REFORM UNDER THE IMF, AND HAS ALSO AGREED TO REFORM IN THE AREAS OF AGRICULTURE AND MILITARY STRUCTURE. IT WOULD BE VERY SHORT-SIGHTED

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TO PUSH HIM SO HARD ON A QUESTION E.G., OF RELEASING POLITICAL PRISONERS WHOM HE BELIEVES HAVE PLOTTED AGAINST HIM, THAT WE JEOPARDIZE FAR MORE MEANINGFUL ECONOMIC

REFORMS IN TERMS OF IMPACT ON THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE AVERAGE ZAIRIAN. MOREOVER, IF WE PUSH TOO HARD FOR POLITICAL CHANGES WHICH OUR ALLIES CONSIDER UNREALISTIC AT THIS STAGE OF ZAIRE'S DEVELOPMENT, WE RISK SEEING MOBUTU DRIVE AN EFFECTIVE WEDGE INTO THE PRESENT "UNITED FRONT" OF DONOR NATIONS, THEREBY GIVING HIMSELF GREATER FREEDOM OF MANEUVER. IN THE PROCESS, WE WOULD ALSO LOSE SOME OF OUR PRESENT ABILITY TO INFLUENCE MOBUTU.

-- -- OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDED ACTIONS. THE APPROACH SKETCHED ABOVE OF PRESSING AHEAD WITH THE IMF, IBRD AND MILITARY REORGANIZATION PROGRAMS WOULD APPEAR TO OFFER THE BEST CHANCE FOR MAKING MEANINGFUL CHANGES IN POLICIES WITH A BROAD IMPACT ON ZAIRIAN HUMAN RIGHTS. WE WOULD SUPPLEMENT THIS INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURE FROM INTERNATIONAL BANKING INSTITUTIONS AND DONOR COUNTRIES WITH PRIVATE ADVICE THROUGH INDIVIDUALS KNOWN TO BE CLOSE TO MOBUTU. WE ARE RETURNING TO THE SITUATION IN WHICH AMBASSADOR CUTLER WILL AGAIN HAVE THE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MOBUTU TO DISCUSS THE NEED FOR REFORMS FRANKLY WITH HIM. CASTIGATION OF ZAIRE IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS DISCUSSING E.G., IFI LOANS IS NOT A PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE APPROACH, EXCEPT AS CRITICISM IS CONCERNED WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC REFORMS. WE WOULD NOT PROPOSE WITHHOLDING PL-480 WHICH IS IMPORTANT FOR MAINTAINING LIVING STANDARDS OF THE POPULATION. BUT WE WOULD WISH TO SIGNAL OUR DISSATISFACTION BY REDUCING LEVELS OF SSA AID AND RATES OF DISBURSEMENT IF IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT ZAIRE IS DELIBERATELY DRAGGING ITS FEET IN IMPLEMENTING NEEDED REFORMS. WE MAY WISH TO SIGNAL

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OUR DISSATISFACTION ALSO BY WITHHOLDING EXIM LOANS OR ABSTAINING ON IFI LOANS, BUT WE NEED TO BE SELECTIVE.

THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE ABOVE APPROACH IS TO LET OUR ALLIES PRESS FOR REFORMS AND TO REDUCE OUR OWN INVOLVEMENT WITH ZAIRE -- AN APPROACH WHICH HARDLY SERVES TO PROMOTE THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ZAIRE.

2. REACTION IN THE HOST COUNTRY

-- WE EXPECT A FAVORABLE REACTION FROM MOST SEGMENTS OF ZAIRIAN SOCIETY TO THE NEW US HUMAN RIGHTS EMPHASIS, TO THE EXTENT OUR APPROACH IS KNOWN AND UNDERSTOOD. INTELLECTUAL CIRCLES CONNECTED WITH THE UNIVERSITY AND EVEN SOME MEMBERS OF THE RULING ELITE HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND THE ORGANIZED CHURCHES - THE ONLY AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTIONS LEFT IN THE COUNTRY - WILL LOOK WITH FAVOR ON ANY USG ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS WHICH WILL SUPPORT THEM IN THEIR DESIRE TO REMAIN AUTONOMOUS. TO THE EXTENT THAT OUR APPROACH EMPHASIZES POLITICAL

RIGHTS OF A POTENTIAL OPPOSITION AS OPPOSED TO ECONOMIC AND MANAGERIAL REFORMS, PRESIDENT MOBUTU WILL VIEW OUR NEW APPROACH WITH SUSPICION. HE WILL PROBABLY TOLERATE USG POLICIES IN THIS AREA AS LONG AS THEY DO NOT, IN

HIS JUDGMENT ENCOURAGE A SERIOUS INCREASE IN OPPOSITION ACTIVITY. OPPOSITION LEADERS HAVE, OF COURSE, WELCOMED OUR EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

3. IMPLICATIONS FOR CHANGE

-- OUR BEST ALLY FOR REFORM IS THE TECHNICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC ELITE WHICH IS OFTEN HIGHLY CRITICAL OF PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S INTERFERENCE IN THE RUNNING OF THE ECONOMY. THE FACT THAT MOBUTU HAS AGREED TO THE IMF STABILIZATION PLAN IS EVIDENCE THAT HE FINALLY
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PREPARED TO LISTEN TO HIS ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ADVISERS. ON THE QUESTION OF ALLOWING GREATER REGIONAL AUTONOMY, MOBUTU WILL CERTAINLY BE CONCERNED NOT TO ALLOW A RESURGENCE OF REGIONAL SEPARATISM, AND HE MAY NEED STRONG PRESSURE FROM HIS ALLIES, NOTABLY A COUNTRY LIKE FRANCE, TO CARRY THROUGH REFORM IN THIS AREA. WHILE MANY OF THE ELITE ARE CRITICAL OF MOBUTU, THEY WISH TO RETAIN THE PERQUISITES OF POWER AND OFFICE, AND THEY WILLBELESS ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT AN EXTENSION OF POLITICAL RIGHTS WHICH COULD BRING THE OPPOSITION TO POWER AT THEIR EXPENSE. IN GENERAL, WE WILL RECEIVE COOPERATION IN PROMOTION OF OUR HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES FROM SELECTED ELEMENTS OF ZAIRIAN SOCIETY AS LONG AS MOBUTU

REMAINS NEUTRAL, I.E., DOES NOT FEEL THREATENED OR OFFENDED AND FEEL HE MUST RESTRICT OUR ACTIONS. CERTAINLY THE MOST FEASIBLE AREA FOR PROGRESS -- AND IN MANY WAYS THE MOST MEANINGFUL -- IS THAT OF ECONOMIC REFORM, WHERE THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE RURAL POPULATION AND IN THE ECONOMIC HEALTH GENERALLY OF THE COUNTRY CONTRIBUTES TO ENHANCE MOBUTU'S OWN POLITICAL POSITION.

4. IMPACT ON U.S. INTERESTS

AS DISCUSSED EARLIER, THE HUMAN RIGHT DEFICIENCIES IN ZAIRE ARE PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF THE COUNTRY'S WEAKNESSES IN THE AREA OF ADMINISTRATION, INFRASTRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE ARE ABLE THROUGH OUR BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE COUNTRY'S INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES, WE WILL BE SERVING BOTH OUR HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES AND OUR LONG-TERM POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PURPOSES TO MAKE ZAIRE AN EFFECTIVE,
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INDEPENDENT NATION AND SOURCE OF STABILITY IN CENTRAL AFRICA. SIMILARLY, ZAIRE'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF MUTUAL OBJECTIVES ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT AS A WHOLE IS DEPENDENT ON ITS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH.

OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY AND OTHER US INTERESTS WOULD BE LIKELY TO DIVERGE ONLY IF WE WERE TO PRESS FOR UNREASONABLE CHANGES AND IMPROVEMENTS IN ZAIRIAN SOCIETY, THEREBY PUSHING THE GOZ TO FEEL THAT IT WAS THREATENED BY THE USG. INSOFAR AS WE PUSH HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL FRIENDLY AND SUPPORTIVE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, OUR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SECURITY, DIPLOMATIC, AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS CAN BE EFFECTIVELY SERVED.
UNQUOTE VANCE

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Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 21-Jun-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE144199
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: AF/C:EMARKS:JR
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D770222-0037
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197706110/baaatbl.tel
Line Count: 563
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 7f1e9e73-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN AF
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: STATE 139160
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2012993
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: HUMAN RIGHTS: DRAFT COUNTRY ACTION PLAN
TAGS: SHUM, CG
To: KINSHASA
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/7f1e9e73-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009